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ABSTRACT. Understanding behavioral responses of recreational fishers to management changes is fundamental for effective policy
making. However, given the diverse motivations and nonmarket nature of recreational fishing, evaluating fishers’ preferences is
nontrivial. This study examined fishers’ management preferences toward different management tools (i.e., a new measure or a change
in the setting for an existing measure) in a highly consumptive recreational fishery. A combination of a discrete choice experiment and
an opinion-based survey explored the potential heterogeneity in management preferences in the Tasmanian Rock Lobster fishery.
Although the fishery has extensive management in place, further restrictions are required to limit recreational harvest in support of a
strategy to achieve a stock rebuilding target. As a diverse fishery, with various fishing methods and a range of activity levels, it is
expected that the perceptions of management changes vary across fisher subgroups. A phone survey was used to ask fishers’ opinions
on how effective different management tools are at restricting catch and if  they supported or opposed the tool. Additionally, a discrete
choice experiment was used to assess if  fishers’ utility is associated with a management tool and to what extent fishers are willing to
trade a change in one management tool for a change in another. Results show that there are both homogenous and heterogeneous
management preferences in the fishery across fisher subgroups. There was consensual aversion by all fisher subgroups toward changes
in management settings that directly limit the catch of lobster, including a reduction in daily bag limit and shortened season length.
Other changes to management settings, such as an increase in the minimum size limit, have less consensus in preference between fisher
groups, and any changes in these tools could differentially impact fisher subgroups. The results from this research can support managers
in identifying whether and to what extent intra-sector separation for the purposes of designing and implementing new management
measures and settings is warranted, on the basis that it can increase effectiveness of achieving management and the likelihood of
maximizing net utility within a fishery.
Key Words: discrete choice experiment; management preferences; recreational fishers
INTRODUCTION
Given the rising pressures on fish stocks and multiple benefits
generated by recreational fishing, the need for responsible and
sustainable recreational fisheries is increasingly recognized (van
Putten et al. 2017, Cooke et al. 2019). There is a myriad of policy
options and objectives for the management of recreational
fisheries with varying effectiveness in aspects such as fisher
enjoyment, compliance, and stock sustainability. Successful
fishery management depends on whether it accounts for various
sources of uncertainty, including variability in resource dynamics
(Hofmann and Powell 1998), uncertainties concerning catch
reporting, monitoring and assessment (Agnew et al. 2009), and
even politicized management decisions (Tsangarides 2007).
Recreational fisheries, however, are managed for participation
and amenity, and these can be countervailing when amenity is
primarily derived from consumption as is the case in highly
consumptive fisheries. Overfishing, lack of effective management,
and consequences of climate change in high value recreational
species, such as abalone, tuna, and rock lobster, has caused the
biological sustainability of these stocks in Australian waters to
be under pressure (Hobday et al. 2011). Specifically, fishers
behaving contrary to management intentions is a consistent factor
contributing to the divergence between the intended and actual
management outcomes, contributing to ineffective management
(Fulton et al. 2011).  
To anticipate behavioral responses to planned management
changes, an acute understanding of fishers’ motivations to
participate in the recreational fishery as well as their preferences
toward different management tools is necessary. A management
tool can be a new measure (e.g., tag system) or a change in the
setting for an existing measure (e.g., reduce bag limit). Specifically,
in high value fisheries, there is often a large and diverse population
of recreational fishers with subgroups forming based on similarity
of behaviors or preferences. Therefore, managers are required to
trade off  the effectiveness of management alternatives on
constraining catches (i.e., fishers’ responses to planned
management changes) and the effects on population-wide utility
and subgroup utility (Bess and Rallapudi 2007). These subgroups
tend to have different behaviors and preferences, consequently
management interventions will have differing impacts in terms of
amenity and management effectiveness. Understanding the
degree and significance of heterogeneity within a recreational
fishery allows policymakers to be informed of distributional
effects and to determine whether to manage for the recreational
fisher population as a whole, or for a series of subpopulations
with different utility preferences and behavioral drivers. It is useful
to identify subgroups based on distinct behaviors and preferences,
such as for-hire or private anglers (Doerpinghaus et al. 2014), or
fishing mode within a multimethod fishery because this allows
clear distinctions for the purposes of group identification and
management. Characteristics such as expert specialization or high
avidity (Scott and Shafer 2001) are important to consider because
these fishers have greater direct impact on the resources.
Generally, it is unadvisable to reduce the preferences of
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heterogeneous fisher populations to homogenous ones that
represent an average fisher (Matsumura et al. 2019).  
Recreational fisheries management has tended to reflect
commercial fisheries management, yet the motivations of fishers
vary between the two. As opposed to commercial fisheries in
which motivations are predominantly related to economic
rewards, motivations vary extensively for recreational fishers
(Fedler and Ditton 1994, Cooke et al. 2019). Broadly, recreational
fishers can engage in either catch-and-release fishing (i.e.,
nonconsumptive) or harvest-orientated fishing (i.e., consumptive;
Yamazaki et al. 2011, Cooke et al. 2019). However, beyond this
dichotomy the motivations become more complex. These
motivations include psychological and physiological benefits,
such as spending time in natural environments, social
engagements with others, a fishery/food resource, and engaging
and overcoming skill and equipment challenges (Fedler and
Ditton 1994). Although there is a plethora of research on fisher
behavior (Duttweiler 1976, Renyard and Hilborn 1986, Matlock
et al. 1988, Teisl et al. 1993, Aas and Skurdal 1996, Fulton et al.
2011, Stoop et al. 2012, Hoshino et al. 2017), the link between
these motivations and responses to management are not always
considered by fisheries scientists or managers (Fulton et al. 2011).  
Given the diverse motivations and nonmarket nature of
recreational fishing, evaluating fishers’ preferences toward
different management tools is nontrivial. Two approaches that
are commonly used to elicit the preferences of heterogenous
recreational fisher populations are (1) fisher surveys to obtain
self-reported measures of management preferences, and (2)
discrete choice experiments (DCEs). For example, previous fisher
surveys have identified heterogeneous preferences of recreational
fishers who are categorized by residence (urban/rural fishers;
Arlinghaus and Mehner 2004), association to fishing locality
(residents/ nonresidents; Teisl et al. 1993), water type (marine/
freshwater; Frijlink and Lyle 2010), and avidity level (Frijlink and
Lyle 2010, Mcllgorm et al. 2016). Discrete choice experiments
have also been used to categorize fishers’ preferences across
specialization (Beardmore et al. 2013) and fishing method (Aas
et al. 2000). A major difference between the two approaches is
that fisher surveys directly ask respondents to self-report their
perceptions of each management tool in question, whereas DCEs
force respondents to consider different management tools
simultaneously and account for trade-offs between them. The
dual methodology may be advantageous because the use of both
enables one to determine fishers’ preferences and opinions on
different management tools for comparable samples of fishers.
We expect that each methodology may have unique advantages
to identify the levels of utility between fisher subgroups, however,
such an application is limited in the literature.  
The aim of this study is to identify the range and diversity of
motivations and expected behaviors of recreational fishers in
response to potential management changes and to what extent
fishers are willing to accept trade-offs between different
management tools in a highly consumptive multimethod fishery.
Specifically, we explored potential heterogeneity in responses
among fishers with different avidity levels and fishing methods.
Avidity has been linked to specialization (Han and Oh 2018) and
centrality to fishing lifestyle (Mcllgorm et al. 2016). Although
avidity can be measured in different ways, such as commitment
to the activity (i.e., willingness to substitute for another activity)
or investment in fishing (Ditton and Sutton 2004), avidity is
typically measured based on number of days fished per season.
In this study, fishing method used by fishers was applied as a proxy
for fishers’ differing in motivations or attitudes because Lyle
(2018) found that mode of fishing in the Tasmanian rock lobster
fishery has been shown to have a strong influence on catch rates,
catch size selectivity, and fisher behavior (in particular effort levels
and fishing strategies). It is likely that preferences are more
complex and heterogeneous within a multigear fishery than in
single-gear fishery because motivations will vary based on the
fishing activity itself  relative to harvest motivations.  
To achieve our research aims, we conducted a phone survey and
a DCE for the current license holders in the Tasmanian east-coast
recreational rock lobster fishery. The phone survey sought fishers’
opinions on how effective different management tools are at
restricting catch, and whether they would be supportive of the
tool. Additionally, the DCE was used to assess if  fishers’ utility
is associated with a management tool and to what extent fishers
are willing to trade off  a change in one management tool for a
change in another tool. The fishery has extensive management in
place, such as separate fishing licenses required for different
fishing methods, bag limits, and seasonal closures, with on-going
discussion around the need for management action to further
constrain recreational harvest to within rebuilding target levels.
Therefore, changes to the management are not solely a
hypothetical scenario. In the Tasmanian east-coast recreational
rock lobster fishery, the stocks have been in decline, and
consequently, a 10-year strategy was implemented in 2013 to
rebuild them to healthy levels. To achieve this, measures to limit
the number of lobsters caught were implemented for the
recreational sector, but it was later found that further restrictions
are required to meet and sustain the stock rebuilding goals (see
Box 1 for more details). As a diverse fishery, with fishers collecting
lobsters via diving, pots, and rings as well as broad avidity levels,
there is an urgent need to identify fishers’ preferences toward
different management tools and to identify which groups of
fishers would be most affected by any future management
changes. 
 Box 1:  
Case study fishery. The southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) is
highly prized within Tasmania, Australia, by both recreational
and commercial fishers. During the 2017-2018 season (November
2017-April 2018) 17,200 people held at least one recreational rock
lobster license (Lyle 2018). They are fished using pots, ring nets,
and through dive collection, and annual licenses are required to
use each of these methods to fish recreationally. During the
2017-2018 season, licensed recreational fishers were estimated to
have harvested roughly 72,000 lobster, based on 77,209 fisher days
of effort, with potting being the dominant fishing method used.
The rock lobster fishery was concentrated off  the east coast of
Tasmania with this area accounting for 70% of the harvest (Lyle
2018). There are daily bag limits, boat limits, and possession limits
in place as well as size limits, closed seasons, and a total ban on
taking females carrying eggs (Lyle 2018).  
In the 2005 management review of the Tasmanian rock lobster
fishery, provision was made for an explicit catch allocation to the
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recreational sector. More recent concerns over the status of the
east coast rock lobster stocks resulted in the implementation a
10-year plan (2013-2023) to rebuild east coast stocks to greater
than 20% of unfished biomass (DPIPWE 2018). The rebuilding
strategy seeks to limit the total rock lobster catch from the east
coast to 200 tonnes and is based on a notional resource sharing
arrangement of 21% for the recreational sector (42 tonnes) and
79% for the commercial sector (158 tonnes). Key elements of the
rebuilding strategy relevant to recreational fishers involved
dividing Tasmania into eastern and western rock lobster fishing
regions (Fig. 1), reducing eastern region bag and possession limits
and delaying the opening of the eastern region fishery. Given a
positive correlation between recreational participation and catch
(Lyle 2018), the number of license holders is expected to increase
along with an increase in the stocks in response to the stock
rebuilding efforts. Because there is currently no limit on the
number of recreational license holders, further restrictions on
catch or effort are likely required to curtail increasing pressures
on the stock. 
Fig. 1. Map showing Tasmanian Australian statistical
geography standard statistical areas rock lobster fishing regions
and the current (2019) east coast stock rebuilding zone. Map
taken from (Lyle 2018).
METHODS
Phone survey
The phone survey involved a random sample of recreational rock
lobster license holders and was focussed on license holders aged
18-years and older who resided in Australian Bureau of Statistics
regions (level SA4) that border the east coast of Tasmania. From
a total sample of 729 license holders for whom phone contact
details were available, contact was made with 674, with 570 (78%
of the net sample) responding to the survey. The phone survey
was conducted between May and June 2018.  
Using a structured questionnaire, fishers’ opinions regarding a
range of fishery and management issues were surveyed. Specific
questions relevant to this study focussed on the respondents’
perceptions regarding whether specific management tools would
be effective in restricting the recreational rock lobster harvest, and
whether they would generally be supportive of the option, on the
understanding that there was a need to limit the rock lobster
harvest to allow for stock rebuilding. Six management tools were
presented; (1) reduction in the recreational bag limit from two to
one lobster per day, (2) increase in the minimum size limit (to
ensure more of the catch is released), (3) reduction in season
length, (4) introduction of an individual seasonal catch limit, (5)
limit on the number of recreational licenses issued, and (6)
reduction in the commercial catch allowance to offset for any
increase in recreation catch. For each respondent, the rock lobster
license(s) held (pot, dive, and/or ring) was known, enabling
individuals to be classified based on fishing mode (pot, dive, or
multimode). In addition, each respondent was classified based on
their avidity (days fishing for rock lobster). Approximately 59%
of the respondents (334 persons) had completed a diary-based
survey of their rock lobster fishing during the 2017/18 fishing
season (Lyle 2018) prior to undertaking the phone survey. This
provided an estimate of days fished (avidity) for each respondent.
For the remaining respondents (236 persons), reported days fished
for rock lobster during 2017/18 was based on recalled
information.  
Phone survey respondents who indicated that they usually fished
off the east coast, the stock rebuilding region, were deemed
eligible to participate in the follow-up DCE survey. In total, 307
phone survey respondents agreed to do the DCE either via mail
or an online platform (104 requested mail surveys and 203
requested online surveys). The online and mail surveys were
conducted between May to October 2018, and 156 completed
DCEs were received (51 mail and 105 online).
Discrete choice experiment
Conceptual framework
Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are a survey-based stated
preference approach that can elicit respondents’ preferences for a
good in question, such as preferences for different management
tools. The DCE evolved from Lancaster’s (1966) theory of
consumer behavior, in which the utility derived from an alternative
is associated with the attributes of the alternatives. In DCE, the
utility of alternatives is characterized based on the assumption
that respondents choose the alternative that provides the greatest
utility for them (Adamowicz et al. 1998). Specifically, our analysis
relies on a random utility model, in which Unsj denotes the utility
of alternative j chosen by respondent n in choice situation s. The
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Table 1. Attributes and levels used in discrete choice experiment.
 
Attribute Description Levels
Status Quo 0 1 2 3 4 5
1. Daily bag limit The number of rock lobster that
any licensed fisher can legally
retain per day
2/day 1/day 3/day
2. Season length The number of weeks the fishing
season is open
As for 2018
(24 weeks)
16 weeks 8 weeks
3. Maximum seasonal
catch
Maximum number that one
licensed fisher can keep over the
entire season
No limit 8 12 16 20 24
4. Minimum size limit
for females
Minimum legal size limit for
female rock lobster
As is
(105 mm)
Increase
by 5 mm
Increase by
10 mm
5. Penalties for
noncompliant act
The penalty given for
noncompliant acts
As is Increase
by 50%
utility Unsj has two separate components: (1) an observable
component of the utility, Vnsj; and (2) unobservable component,
εnsj, such that: 
Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj  (1)
Unsj = βXnsj + εnsj (2)
Prob(yit = j) = (3)
exp(βXnsj)
exp(βXnsj)
_____________
Σ s=1s
  
The observable component of the utility, Vnsj, is expressed in terms
of a linear combination of k attributes, such that: 
Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj  (1)
Unsj = βXnsj + εnsj (2)
Prob(yit = j) = (3)
exp(βXnsj)
exp(βXnsj)
_____________
Σ s=1s
  
where Xnsj is a vector of k observed attributes for the good in
question, and β is a vector of the corresponding parameters (i.e.,
marginal utilities). In choice situation s, respondent n will choose
alternative j if  Unsj > Unsi for all j ≠ i. Assuming a Type I extreme
value distribution for the unobservable component, εnsj, the
probability that respondent n chooses alternative j in choice
situation in s is given by (Mcfadden 1981): 
Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj  (1)
Unsj = βXnsj + εnsj (2)
Prob(yit = j) = (3)
exp(βXnsj)
exp(βXnsj)
_____________
Σ s=1s  
Equation (3) provides a basis to model the choices made by
respondents in DCE as a function of the attributes. That is,
discrete choice data are used to determine the attributes, which
are significantly associated with respondents’ utility, and the
extent to which respondents are willing to trade one attribute for
another. Although a number of challenges have been identified
(Carson 2012, Hausman 2012), the usefulness of DCE to support
policymaking has been widely acknowledged (Börger et al. 2014,
Rogers et al. 2015, Marre et al. 2016). The main advantage of
DCE over a self-reported survey is that survey respondents are
placed in a choice situation requiring them to consider trade-offs
between attributes and to choose the alternative that provides the
greatest utility.
Discrete choice experiment design
Alternatives in a DCE are defined by a set of attributes and their
levels. Table 1 provides the description of each attribute and
associated levels used in this study. We based attribute and level
selection on a number of sources, including: (1) a discussion paper
summarizing management options to restrain rock lobster catches
(DPIPWE, unpublished data); (2) results from previous
recreational rock lobster surveys (Lyle and Tracey 2016, 2017,
Lyle 2018); and (3) extensive discussions with fishery experts.
Because the objective of the study is to examine management
preferences and the fishery is predominantly a consumptive
fishery, attributes of the fishing experience were not included.  
To determine the number of attributes and the levels, we first
identified management tools that are already in place or have been
discussed for future management use. We then selected five tools
as management attribute: those considered the most effective at
reducing catch in this fishery and having clear links to recreational
fishing experience. The attributes included in the DCE are: (1)
daily bag limit, (2) season length, (3) maximum seasonal catch
limit per person, (4) minimum size limit for female rock lobster,
and (5) penalties for noncompliant acts (Table 1).  
The daily bag limit at the time of study was two lobster. The bag
limit had been reduced from five to three in 2011 and then to two
lobster per day in 2015. These reductions in bag limit appear to
have had little direct impact on annual catches, in part because
the higher bag limits are rarely achieved by pot fishers who
account for the bulk of the total catch (Lyle et al. 2019). Therefore,
we considered a further restriction to one, as well as renewing the
bag limit to three as the levels of this attribute. Additionally,
within a scenario in which there is an increase in bag limit, other
management tools would be restricted to offset any reduction in
utility, therefore total catch may not be affected. The attribute
level for the season length was progressively reduced from 24
weeks (as applied in 2018) to 8 weeks. The lower limit choice has
relevance because recreational fishing effort is heavily
concentrated in the first two months of the season, a period that
has typically accounted for over 70% of the total seasonal catch
and effort (Lyle and Tracey 2016, 2017, Lyle 2018). The maximum
seasonal catch limit was progressively reduced from 40 lobster,
representing the upper 95th percentile based on individual annual
catches determined for previous catch and effort surveys, to 8
lobster, slightly higher than the mean individual annual catch
taken by rock lobster license holders in recent years (Lyle and
Tracey 2016, 2017, Lyle 2018). An increase in the minimum size
limit is another restriction that has been proposed as a measure
Ecology and Society 25(2): 22
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol25/iss2/art22/
Fig. 2. Example choice set given to fishers.
to assist with stock rebuilding by providing additional protection
to the adult stock and enhance egg production. We set the levels
of this attribute relative in scale to size increases that would
provide at least a year of additional protection to breeding
females. Finally, for attribute (5), we were nonspecific with the
status quo level and alternative because a penalty for a
noncompliant act can take many forms. All attributes, except
attribute (3), are already in place in this fishery, with the status
quo representing the current management. There is currently no
limit on the maximum number of lobster one licensed fisher can
catch in a season, however, implementing such a restriction has
been discussed with resource managers and stakeholders as a
potential tool to reduce the overall recreational catch.  
In total, there are 324 combinations for the 5 attributes and
associated levels in Table 1. It is not feasible to ask respondents
to select their choice from the universe of all possible
combinations. Relevant combinations of attribute levels can be
generated in multiple ways, such as orthogonal designs (Louviere
et al. 2000) or efficient designs (Rose and Bliemer 2009). In this
study, an efficient design was used to avoid unrealistic scenarios
in the management context of this fishery. Using a priori
expectations of the parameter estimates, efficient designs can also
improve the reliability of the estimated parameters (i.e., standard
errors) for a given sample size (Huber and Zwerina 1996). The
utility for each attribute was modeled using Ngene
(ChoiceMetrics http://www.choice-metrics.com/index.html), which
produced 18 choice sets (i.e., scenarios) with balanced utility, as
per the efficient design. Although it is possible for respondents to
answer all choice sets, it is common to divide the choice sets into
blocks to make the DCE quicker to complete and reduce
participant fatigue. We had three blocks of six choice sets. To
minimize any ordering effect, we randomiszed the order of each
of the blocks into five orders. The order and block of the choice
sets were randomly allocated per respondent.  
For each choice set, respondents were asked to compare the
options and decide which option they would choose to renew their
license for or whether they would choose not to renew their license
(Fig. 2). Following the choice task, respondents were asked to
complete a self-assessment on the understanding and confidence
in completing the DCE. Respondents who opted out for every
choice set were removed from the analysis because these were
considered protest votes (n = 6), and those who answered “not
certain at all” to conducting the DCE were also removed (n = 7;
Freeman 1986). In addition to the choice sets, we collected data
on fishers’ participation, fishing methods, demographics, and
motivation and attitudes toward compliance management in the
same survey.
Data analysis
Discrete choice data from the DCE were modeled by a conditional
logit model that estimates the marginal utility associated with
each attribute; i.e., β in Equation (3). Estimates of the marginal
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Table 2. Fishers’ opinion on effectiveness and support of management tools.
 
Management tool Effective Support Support effectiveness
correlation
Response No. % No. %
Yes 204 40.6 143 28.7 0.792
No/Not really 288 57.4 344 68.9
Reduce the daily bag limit to one per day
Unsure 10 2.0 12 2.4
Yes 272 54.3 244 48.9 0.870
No/Not really 205 40.9 235 47.1
Further reduce the length of the season (in
the eastern region)
Unsure 24 4.8 20 4.0
Yes 380 75.7 369 73.9 0.885
No/Not really 107 21.3 114 22.8
Unsure 15 3.0 16 3.2
Introduce a maximum east-coast seasonal
catch limit for each license holder
Yes 306 60.8 274 54.8 0.848
No/Not really 170 33.8 204 40.8
Increase the minimum size limit, meaning
more of the catch is released
Unsure 27 5.4 22 4.4
Yes 83 16.6 45 9.0 0.899
No/Not really 388 77.6 425 85.3
Unsure 29 5.8 28 5.6
Limit the number of licenses that have
access to the eastern region for lobster
Yes 291 58.1 266 54.6 0.881
No/Not really 160 31.9 175 35.9
Unsure 50 10.0 46 9.4
Reduce the commercial catch allowance to
offset any increase in recreational catches
utility were then used to assess if  and to what extent respondents
are willing to trade one management attribute for another while
maintaining the same level of utility. For this, the marginal rate
of substitution between two attributes provides an estimate of the
relative importance of one attribute compared to the other.
Specifically, we calculated the marginal rate of substitution of
attributes (2)-(5), relative to reduction of bag limit by one lobster.
For example, the ratio βseason length / βbag limit represents, if  the bag
limit was reduced by one, how long the season length would have
to increase to account for the utility loss. To examine heterogeneity
in preferences, we first estimated the model for the entire sample,
and then for the subsample of fishers who used different methods
and those who had different avidity levels. We also estimated
different models to test for the sensitivity of the main results to
various model specifications and assumptions (see Appendix 1).
RESULTS
Distribution of fishing methods and avidity
For fishers who participated in the phone survey, potting (either
just potting or in combination with ring nets) was the most
common fishing method used (51%). Multiuse (a combination of
diving and potting or ring nets) was the second largest group
(35%), and diving was the least common group (14%). The
distribution was analogous between the fishers surveyed in the
phone survey and the DCE (Fig. 3a). The 50% of fishers who
participated in the DCE used only pots or pots and ring nets, 13%
of fishers dived for lobster and 36% of fishers used a combination
of these methods. The distribution is consistent with the
distribution found in previous recreational rock lobster surveys
(Lyle 2018).  
The distribution of avidity of fishers (i.e., reported number of
fishing days per season) differed between the phone survey and
the DCE (Fig. 3b). The phone survey sample comprised of 60%
low avid fishers (10 days per season or below), 29% mid avid fishers
(11-25 days per season), and 11% high avid fishers (over 25 days
per season). In contrast, the DCE sample consisted of only 42%
low avid fishers, 32% mid avid fishers, but 26% high avid fishers.
The skew in avidity between the surveys, with high avid fishers
representing more of the sample for the DCE, is likely because
high avid fishers are more willing to take part in surveys related
to fishing than low avid fishers. The correlation between fishing
method and avidity was low for both surveys (r = -0.1 for phone
survey and r = 0.07 for DCE), suggesting that heterogeneity in
management preferences in the two categorizations of fishers may
be different to each other.
Fig. 3. Distribution of a) fishing method by license type and b)
avidity of the fishers who took part in the phone survey and the
choice experiment.
Phone survey management preferences
Support varies across the management tools. Across all the
management tools, on average 45% of respondents supported the
management tools, limiting license numbers was considerably
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lower at only 9% support (Table 2). The most strongly supported
and perceived effective management tool was a maximum
individual seasonal catch limit. In total 75.7% of respondents
agreed that it would be an effective tool with 73.9% indicating in
principle support for such a measure. However, when asked “How
many lobsters would you consider as acceptable for such a
seasonal catch limit?” as a follow up question, responses ranged
from 2-300 lobster per fisher per season. The median was 20
lobster per season (mean 25.9), with 16% of respondents
recommending limits of 40 or more and 2% limits of 100 or more
lobster. The vast range in the acceptable maximum number of
lobster questions the effectiveness of the management tool serving
as a catch cap in practice. This would explain why limiting the
number of licenses was the least supported and perceived
management tool because it effectively restricts the catch in
practice, i.e., 77.6% of fishers thought it was not an effective tool
and 85.3% indicated they would not support it.  
There is a small proportion of fishers who were unsure about the
effectiveness or if  they would support any of the management
tools (ranging 2-10% across different management tools). The
lowest proportion of unsure responses was for a reduction in daily
bag limit, suggesting high certainty of opinion, whereas 10% of
fishers were unsure for a reduction of commercial catch
allowance, suggesting low certainty of opinion around this
management tool. There is a strong positive correlation between
supporting the management tool and perceived effectiveness (last
column Table 2). This suggests that if  a management tool is
perceived to be effective, then it is generally supported (or vice
versa if  it is supported then it is perceived to be effective).  
We detect heterogeneity in support once we compare fishing
methods and avidity levels (Fig. 4). Divers were the most
supportive subgroup for all management tools, except the
introduction of a seasonal catch limit. A reduction of bag limit
has significantly lower support from potters and multiuse fishers
than from divers (χ2 = 15.20, df = 2, p = 0.0005). Likewise, an
increase in size limit has more support from divers compared to
potters and multiuse fishers (χ2 = 6.75, df = 2, p = 0.034). There
were no significant differences for the other management tools
for fishing method. When categorized by avidity level, we
observed that fewer avid fishers were generally more supportive
of management tools. However, only a reduction of season length
was significantly different for the levels of avidity (χ2 = 7.64, df
= 2, p = 0.02194).
Discrete choice experiment management preferences
The results of the choice experiment for the full responding
sample showed that all management tools have positive
coefficients, and this is expected because fishers on average prefer
less regulation (Fig. 5). However, only a bag limit and season
length were significant at the 5% level and introducing a maximum
season length was significant at the 10% level. An increased
minimum size limit and increased penalties were not significant
for the whole sample.  
When the model was estimated for the subsample of each fishing
mode, bag limit had a significant coefficient for all fishing methods
(Fig. 6a), meaning that there is no heterogeneity in preferences
toward the bag limit. The regression, however, shows
heterogeneous preferences for season length and maximum
seasonal catch limit. The coefficient for season length was
Fig. 4. The proportion of fishers who support each
management tool for (a) different fishing methods and (b)
different levels of avidity determined by the number of fishing
days per season. Unsure and NA responses were removed.
Significant difference between groups from chi squared test of
independence indicated by the asterisks, (p-values: <
0.001 = ***, < 0.01 = **, < 0.05 = *, < 0.1 = .).
Fig. 5. Conditional logit model results of the choice experiment
responses for all fishers. Error bars indicate standard error (p-
values: < 0.001 = ***, < 0.01 = **, < 0.05 = *, < 0.1 = .). See
Appendix 1, Table 1 for detailed regression results.
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significant and positive, indicating preference for an increase in
season length, for potters and multiuse fishers, but not significant
for divers. This may be due to the low number of observations for
this group and therefore results for this group must be interpreted
with care. Likewise, the coefficient for maximum seasonal catch
was significant for divers and potters only, indicating preference
for a higher maximum seasonal catch (the latter only at the 10%
level). All other management tools; increase in size limit and
increase in penalties were not significant for all fishing methods.
Fig. 6. Conditional logit model results of the choice experiment
responses for (a) each fishing method and (b) each avidity level.
Error bars indicate standard error (p-values: < 0.001 = ***, <
0.01= **, < 0.05 = *, < 0.1 = .). See Appendix 1, Table 1 for the
detailed regression results.
Across all levels of avidity, bag limit and an increase in season
length were the management tools which have a significantly
positive coefficient (Fig. 6b). A maximum seasonal catch limit
was significant for low avid fishers only. An increase in size limits
for females was only significant for high avid fishers whereas an
increase in penalties was not significant for all fishers. A sensitivity
analysis was also undertaken to statistically test differences
between groups and under different model specifications
(Appendix 1, Tables A1.2 and A1.3). These results show that
fishers responses to the phone survey and DCE are consistent;
that is, those who supported or perceived a greater number of
management tools effective were more likely to be affected by
management changes. We have also estimated a pooled
conditional logit model, the results of which indicated that those
who support the minimum size limit for females as an effective
management tools are more likely to be affected by a change in
this management tool.
Management trade-offs
The trade-offs fishers are willing to make for a reduction of bag
limit by one lobster is reported in Figure 7 (Appendix 1, Table
A1.4). The results are presented for the full sample, as well as for
fishing mode and avidity level subgroups. Fishers are on average
willing to accept a decrease in the bag limit by one lobster if  the
season length increases by 3.5 weeks (Fig. 7a). This trade-off
ranges from the highest for potters (4.5 weeks) and low avid fishers
(4.4 weeks) to the lowest for multiuse fishers (2.9 weeks) and high
avid fishers (2.6 weeks). This result suggests that the value of
season length is felt by most fishers but is relatively higher for
potters and low avid fishers.  
The variability across different groups of fishers in the trade-off
for season length is less compared to the other management tools.
The trade-off  for a maximum seasonal catch is highly variable
across groups (Fig. 7b). The highest trade-off  is for divers at 1.5
lobsters per season, indicating that divers would be most affected
by the introduction of the maximum seasonal catch limit. For size
limit for females, the trade-off  is highest for high avid fishers who
are willing to accept a decrease in the bag limit by one lobster if
the size limit for females decreases by 2.9 cm. Finally, the trade-
off  for penalties is relatively consistent across groups, except for
mid and high avid fishers.
DISCUSSION
To account for behavioral responses to the management of
recreational fisheries, it is important to improve our
understanding of fishers’ preferences toward different
management tools. To this end, we conducted a phone survey and
a discrete choice experiment in the rock lobster fishery in the east
coast of Tasmania as a case study of a highly consumptive
recreational fishery with diverse fisher groups. Acknowledging
the links between avidity and fishing methods as proxies for
motivations and behaviors in this fishery (Lyle 2018), we focussed
on these two categorizations of fishers to evaluate recreational
fishers’ preferences of different management tools, which are
either already in place or have been discussed for use in future
management to reduce catch and assist in stock rebuilding. We
specifically explored fishing mode and avidity levels because they
are clear distinctions for potential intra-sector separation within
this fishery with expected heterogeneity of management
preferences and behaviors.  
Overall our results show that preferences for some management
tools are homogenous across fishers that differ in avidity and
divergent fishing methods, whereas preferences for other tools are
heterogenous. There was consensual aversion toward a reduction
in daily bag limit. This was evident from the low perceived
effectiveness and support, and the finding that a reduction in daily
bag limit significantly decreases fishers’ utility for all groups. This
was anticipated because it is a highly consumptive harvest-
oriented fishery and a high value is given to immediate
gratification. A reduction in season length was another
management tool that was found to have an impact on most
fishers’ utility, except divers and high avid fishers. In the phone
survey, however, highly avid fishers indicated the lowest support
for a reduction in season length and the trade-off  between season
length and daily bag limit had little variability across groups
indicating a homogenous preference toward season length. In
contrast to these management tools, we found heterogeneous
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Fig. 7. Trade-offs fishers are willing to make between a reduction in bag limit by one lobster and a
change in (a) season length, (b) maximum seasonal catch, (c) minimum size limit for females, and
(d) penalties for noncompliant acts. See Appendix 1, Table 4 for detailed results.
preferences for an introduced maximum seasonal catch and an
increase in minimum size limit. These results may reflect the fact
that the management tools in which there was heterogeneity in
preferences limit catch indirectly. A reduction in bag limit and a
shortened season, however, have direct and clear implications on
expected catch and recreation time. There was clear consensus
among fishers about these management tools, whereas a change
in size limit or an introduced maximum seasonal catch require
some individual reflection on their historical and expected catch
rates and sizes.  
Among fishers who use different fishing methods, the phone
survey results suggested that divers were generally the most
supportive group for further management. However, the DCE
showed that these fishers would be the most impacted if  a
maximum seasonal catch was implemented. This was indicated
by the largest trade-off  required in the maximum seasonal catch.
This is expected because divers had the largest average daily
harvest rates in 2017/2018 compared to the other fishing methods
(average 1.59 lobster per day fished for dive collection compared
to 1.38 for rings and 0.73 for pots; Lyle 2018). However, our results
also suggest that most fishers will be affected if  a maximum
seasonal catch limit is implemented to meet the stock rebuilding
goals. Given the number of recreational fishers in the 2017/2018
season, the maximum season catch would need to be set at ~ 4
lobster per fisher to meet the 42-tonne total allowable recreational
catch for the east coast region of Tasmania. This is considerably
lower than the mean or median acceptable number of lobsters per
season (25.9 and 20, respectively) perceived by fishers. This
assumes that every fisher would catch their limit; in reality this
limit would have the most impact on the high avid fishers and a
lot of fishers would actually catch this limit or under.
SPECULATIONS
The results suggest there is potential for intra-sector separation
management within this highly consumptive multiuse fishery. For
example, although high avid fishers only accounted for a small
proportion of our survey, they accounted for the most impact on
stocks because they fish most frequently. Our survey results found
low avid fishers were generally most supportive for all
management tools in the phone survey, except limiting the number
of licenses, whereas high avid fishers had the lowest support for
most management tools. It is crucial for the high avid population
to be compliant with the regulatory settings to support long-term
sustainability of the rock lobster population. In this case, fisheries
managers could implement regulations that have the greatest
impact on this group (Doerpinghaus et al. 2014). For example,
for high avid fishers, an increase in penalties was not significant
in the DCE, however, there was a large marginal rate of
substitution for penalties compared to a reduction in bag limit.
Therefore, the use of economic incentives or disincentives
targeting this subgroup may be highly effective; for example, a
higher license fee for those fishing more than 25 days a season.
Alternatively, management measures and settings can be tailored
by fishing method based on preferences and behaviors. On
average, potters fish more regularly per season but have lower
catch rates (Lyle 2018), therefore efforts to reduce catch could be
tailored around season length. Divers, on the other hand, spend
on average half  as many days harvesting per season but have
higher catch rates (Lyle 2018), therefore tailored regulatory
settings could reduce daily or seasonal catch limits. The
implementation of any new regulatory settings especially
subgroup specific would have to be carefully done to minimize
unintended consequences or noncompliance. However, the
diverse preferences and behaviors of these subgroups could be
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accounted for through tailored regulatory settings that can
maximize catch and utility. The nuance between fisher groups was
more evident in the discrete choice experiment compared to the
phone survey. Given this finding, it would appear that in a context
with prominent intra-sector separation, a discrete choice
experiment is a more valuable tool compared to a survey alone
for measuring heterogeneous fisher utility.  
There are some caveats that should be considered when our results
are interpreted and applied to other recreational fisheries. Despite
efforts to reduce sampling biases like random selection, there is a
chance the sample may be a product of participation/nonresponse
bias because the respondents who refused to take part may have
varied with the reported results; there is a chance of self-selection
bias in the fishers who chose to take part in both surveys, which
will affect generalizability of the results; and there may have been
strategic bias in the phone survey in which fishers were asked to
express their opinions about each management tool
independently. Although the survey was conducted with no
reference to government involvement, fishers may have not
revealed true beliefs because of the sensitivity of the topic. For
example, fishers may have indicated that a tool was not effective
or not having support because they would not want this tool to
be implemented; e.g., low support and perceived effectiveness for
bag limit reduction. The joint use of an opinion-based measure
of management preferences and DCE analysis may help to
identity such potential bias because DCEs force survey
participants to consider trade-offs between different management
tools. There was a skewed representation of high avid fishers in
the DCE data. This is consistent with other literature, in which a
self-nominated survey represents a subpopulation of more avid
fishers (Mcllgorm et al. 2016). Although our results from the
phone survey and DCE are consistent with each other, the more
significant preference heterogeneity across different avidity levels
identified in the DCE analysis is possibly due to the higher
representation of high avid fishers in the data. Lastly, we
categorized fishers prior to the data analysis using fishing
methods and avidity because they are indicative of fishers’
motivations and behavior in our case study (Lyle 2018). However,
in fisheries in which these relationships are not well established,
a subgroup categorization of fishers is not possible, other
potential grouping to explore underlying heterogeneity would be
age and resident/nonresident. An alternative way to deal with
potential heterogeneity in preferences is to use a latent class
model. Although the details of these models are provided in
Hensher et al. (2005), the models assume that individual
preferences for each attribute are not fixed within the sample but
can be categorized into group preferences (latent class models).
CONCLUSION
We set out to understand the heterogeneity in fishers’ preferences
across different fishing methods and avidity levels. We found that
there is some consensus in opinions and preferences for
management tools, and this was related to how direct a
management tool has on catch. The importance, application, and
novelty of these results relate to the added insight toward effective
evidence-based decision making for recreational fisheries
management. Within this context, for example, it was highlighted
that a reduction in bag limit or season length would be disruptive
to all fishers, which may even lead fishers to leave the fishery or
to practice noncompliant behavior. Changes to the management
tools that had less consistency in preference, such as an increase
in minimum size limit, may be better received and have less impact
on fishers’ behavior because they do have an impact on catch but
indirectly. Considering the multiple objectives that are involved
in fisheries management, the results provide the necessary
understanding of preferences across the groups and for each
management tool. Management tools that target indirect catch
reduction may be a more successful tactic to fulfil restocking goals
while minimizing utility impact of fishers. Using an approach to
evaluate preferences for inclusion in the decision-making process
is highly advisable because decision makers can justify decisions
on accordant divergent preferences and weigh up the trade-offs
in different management tools. We expect future research to build
on this understanding that fisheries may have homogenous and
heterogeneous preferences and behaviors to then better assess and
explain actions in catch, compliance, and participation that may
have previously been amalgamated and generalized across the
fishing population.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
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Appendix 1. Model results and sensitivity analysis 
 
Table A.1. Conditional logit on discrete choice experiment data for different fishing methods and fishing avidity levels 
 
  Figure 5  Figure 6 (a)   Figure 6 (b)  
  All fishers  Potters Divers Multi  Low avidity Mid avidity High avidity 
Bag limit 
0.517  0.502 0.433 0.573  0.616 0.437 0.517 
(<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (0.003)** (<0.001) ***  (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Season length 
0.246  0.28 0.207 0.205  0.339 0.193 0.171 
(<0.001)***  (<0.001)*** (0.111) (0.011)*  (<0.001)*** (0.023)* (0.068)^ 
Maximum seasonal catch limit 
0.044  0.059 0.164 -0.023  0.109 0.027 -0.044 
(0.072)^  (0.085)^ (0.014)* (0.574)  (0.004)** (0.523) (0.374) 
Size limit 
0.076  0.061 -0.008 0.125  -0.067 0.124 0.298 
(0.209)  (0.468) (0.961) (0.229)  (0.475) (0.270) (0.010)** 
Penalties for non-compliant acts 
0.103  0.102 0.057 0.131  0.186 -0.184 0.32 
(0.297)  (0.460) (0.833) (0.433)  (0.223) (0.299) (0.106) 
Constant 
-1.979  -2.041 -2.045 -1.864  -2.395 -1.657 -1.877 
(<0.001)***    (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)***   (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  
Number of observations 2,574  1,314 342 918  1,080 828 666 
Number of subjects 143  72 19 51  60 46 37 
Log-likelihood -1459.7  -740.7 -193.7 -521.7  -582.5 -486.7 -377.7 
McFadden's pseudo-R2 0.109  0.114 0.11 0.107  0.153 0.077 0.109 
AIC 2931.3   1493.5 399.39 1055.4   1176.9 985.34 767.43 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses from different model specifications. p-values:  <0.001 =***, <0.01= 
**, <0.05 = *, <0.1 = ^ 
Table A.2. Sensitivity analysis: different model specifications 
  Baseline   Subsample 
  (Figure 5)  Mixed logit Non-potters Support Non-support Effective Non-effective 
Bag limit 
0.517  0.657 0.533 0.495 0.472 0.450 0.618 
(<0.001)***  (<0.001)*** (<0.001)***  (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Season length 
0.246  0.230 0.210 0.519 0.223 0.438 0.211 
(<0.001)***  (0.013)* (0.002)** (<0.001)*** (0.003)** (<0.001)*** (0.007)** 
Maximum seasonal catch limit 
0.044  -0.007 0.028 0.179 0.016 0.052 -0.008 
(0.072)^  (0.918) (0.416) (<0.001)*** (0.688) (0.180) (0.834) 
Size limit 
0.076  0.089 0.091 0.091 -0.141 0.208 -0.233 
(0.209)  (0.347) (0.290) (0.440) (0.140) (0.026)* (0.021)* 
Penalties for non-compliant acts 
0.103  0.135 0.106 0.012 0.065 -0.010 0.192 
(0.297)  (0.431) (0.452) (0.951) (0.683) (0.948) (0.234) 
Constant 
-1.979  -2.133 -1.917 -2.788 -1.608 -2.277 -1.723 
(<0.001)***    (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (<0.001)*** (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  
Number of observations 2,574  2,574 1260 702 1,008 1044 990 
Number of subjects 143  143 70 39 56 58 55 
Log-likelihood -1459.7  -1457.0 -718.4 -361.1 -597.3 -569.5 -570.8 
McFadden's pseudo-R2 0.109  0.104 0.104 0.192 0.069 0.143 0.094 
AIC 2931.3   2938.0 1448.8 734.19 1206.6 1151.0 1153.6 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses from different model specifications. p-values:  <0.001 =***, 
<0.01= **, <0.05 = *, <0.1 = ^. Non-potters correspond to the subsample of divers and multi-use fishers; Support correspond to the subsample of 
fishers who are supportive to more than three management tools in the phone survey; Non-support correspond to the subsample of fishers who are 
supportive to less than three management tools; Effective corresponds to the subsample of fishers who perceive more than three management tools 
effective; and non-effective corresponds to the sub-sample of fishes who perceive less than three management tools effective. 
 
 
Table A.3. Sensitivity analysis: conditional logit model with interaction terms 
  
Baseline    
(Figure 5) Method Avidity Support Effective 
Bag limit 
0.517 0.532 0.514 0.523 0.550 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)***  (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Season length 
0.246 0.252 0.270 0.205 0.199 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)***  (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Maximum seasonal catch 
limit 
0.044 0.026 0.069 0.044 0.045 
(0.072)^ (0.315) (0.013)* (0.204) (0.198) 
Size limit for females 
0.076 0.087 -0.004 -0.137 -0.207 
(0.209) (0.181) (0.958) (0.087)^ (0.014)* 
Penalties for non-compliant 
acts 
0.103 0.112 0.032 0.054 0.069 
(0.297) (0.292) (0.780) (0.600) (0.498) 
Divers, High avid, Support or 
Effective  
    
 
     Bag limit  
-0.111 0.023 0.009 -0.062 
 (0.451) (0.844) (0.870) (0.248) 
     Season length 
 -0.056 -0.082 0.069 0.070 
 (0.672) (0.427) (0.164) (0.176) 
     Maximum seasonal catch  
 0.133 -0.106 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.052)^ (0.053)^ (0.696) (0.931) 
      Size limit for females  
 -0.098 0.307 0.371 0.436 
 (0.569) (0.023)* (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
      Penalties  
 -0.057 0.293 
 
 
 (0.843) (0.200)   
Constant 
-1.979 -1.977 -1.986 -1.945 -1.971 
(<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  (<0.001)***  
Number of observations 2,574 2,574 2,574 2,430 2484 
Number of subjects 143 143 143 135 138 
Log-likelihood -1459.7 -1457.8 -1455.4 -1370.8 -1394.6 
McFadden's pseudo-R2 0.109 0.110 0.112 0.163 0.149 
AIC 2931.3 2937.5 2932.9 2761.7 2809.2 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses from different 
model specifications. p-values:  <0.001 =***, <0.01= **, <0.05 = *, <0.1 = ^ 
Table A.4. Trade-offs fishers are willing to make between a reduction in bag limit by one lobster and a change in season length, maximum 
seasonal catch, minimum size limit for females, and penalties for non-compliant acts. 
 
 All fishers Potters Divers Multi Low Avidity Mid Avidity High Avidity 
Season length 3.80 4.46 3.83 2.87 4.40 3.54 2.65 
Max seasonal catch  0.34 0.47 1.51 -0.16 0.71 0.25 -0.34 
Size limit for females -0.73 -0.61 0.09 -1.09 0.54 -1.42 -2.88 
Increase in penalties -9.96 -10.16 -6.60 -11.40 -15.11 21.10 -30.99 
 
